A Geography Lesson

  VIEWS FROM OUTSIDE THE APIARY: IAN FLETCHER 

With a Chinese naval fleet undertaking live firing in the Tasman Sea, former head of New Zealand’s security bureau Ian Fletcher explains how security in this area of the world has changed.

There’s a lot to write about this week. But the most sobering topic has been the Chinese naval squadron manoeuvring off Australia. I fear many New Zealanders haven’t seen what this means.

Chinese warships in the Tasman Sea. (Supplied: ADF)

In the past, when New Zealand and Australia have become embroiled in conflicts, those conflicts have been abroad. In foreign countries, far from home. Ships have been used to take our men and equipment off to war. Yes, the Japanese raided Northern Australia in WW2, and Japanese submarines raided Sydney. But neither was a serious challenge to Australia, and certainly not to New Zealand.

Events over recent days show that this has changed. China, which is not a foe, but which is a potential foe, has shown that it can operate in our waters, in force. Like some commentators, I assume that the Chinese squadron was accompanied by a submarine, adding to its combat effectiveness.

For Australia, this is a direct challenge. Australia is building up its navy significantly, with the implicit role of moving north in the event of conflict, to support the Philippines and to assist the US and perhaps Japan to blockade China. Even if Taiwan falls to the Chinese, a naval blockade of China would starve China into submission, as China’s supplies of oil and food are delivered by sea.

While New Zealand’s isolation geographically might have historically been considered to benefit the country’s security, in the modern world it is also a major cause for concern warns Ian Fletcher. 

Now, Australia must expect that its navy may be challenged in home waters. That challenge would make shipping to and from Australia uninsurable, and be at minimum very disruptive. Airports, ports and air bases would be vulnerable too. Australians now know they have a home defence problem. The price of supporting the US just went up, sharply, in the same week that the US turned out to be a whole lot less reliable than anyone expected.

Of course, the Chinese have had this capability for some time. What’s happened is that they have now shown everyone, and made the home defence issue a public one. Defence is a major political issue in Australia, as it should be. The sudden, remarkable unreliability of the US is the topic Australians may be avoiding, but hopefully mature debate will come.

For New Zealand, the lessons are even more stark. We would be completely vulnerable to aggression by a squadron of the sort we have just seen. We have no meaningful air force to provide cover or deterrence, and our three useful ships and four useful planes are concentrated in Ohakea and Devonport. I’m not sure that Australia could provide air cover right across the Tasman for long. So, we’re easy targets.

We depend on shipping for imports of fuel (especially aviation fuel and diesel), without which we couldn’t sustain normal life. We depend on internet connections to the rest of the world (and we have seen that internet cable-cutting is now a practised skill in many places). We are sitting ducks.

Could it be worse? Antarctica beckons as a source of minerals, and its demilitarised status is eroding. We offer a gateway. And we have no real way to assert ourselves or fend off aggression or blackmail. And, back to the submarine we hypothesise has been with the Chinese squadron: the Southern Ocean already offers nuclear-powered submarines a nautical motorway, where they can sail around the world quickly, and take off-ramps into the Indian and Atlantic oceans. Just look at a globe.

People's Liberation Army-Navy (PLA-N) Jiangkai-class frigate Hengyang has been spotted in the Tasman Sea.  (Supplied: ADF)

What can we do? We need to recognise two things: firstly, this is not a new capability on China’s part. But flaunting it is a new policy. It’s a warning, and an implicit threat. Australia is the main target, but we’re caught up. Secondly, our defences are negligible. The current Minister of Defence, Judith Collins (who has far too many other roles) refers to the NZDF as being in intensive care. She aims, she says, to “get it into the ward”. This will not do. “National security” used to be vapid, show-off stuff for our politicians. Now, they need to grow up and take it, and us, seriously.

What should the action list look like? First, we need what’s actually called a “War Book”: it’s a proper, previously-agreed plan as to how we would deal with disruptive conflict, aimed at preserving as much of our way of life as we could until things were over. Without internet, GPS, transport fuels, and reliable international air and sea links you can imagine this will be a tough book to write. It would necessarily be like civil defence planning, written in a way that engages the whole community.

Secondly, we need to decide how to beef up defence. This is no longer optional, nor a matter for gestures (for example, buying a new plane for the PM and calling it “strategic airlift” is simply a fraud on the taxpayer). If we don’t take this seriously, my view is the Australians will make us. They are likely to elect a new, much less friendly government by May, and I really hope we have a better story to tell by then.

In my (controversial) view, the big decision ought to be to re-acquire a proper air force (ie with combat jets, drones and some air refuelling capacity so planes can operate right across the Tasman). Shockingly, eye wateringly, expensive, and very hard to do quickly. But equally hard to see the alternative now. I hesitated writing this, knowing just how our national discourse has settled on the idea that we don’t need an air force. But now, we do. We should be prepared to change our minds when the facts change.

Other countries face bigger challenges with similar populations, and make a virtue of getting things sorted and being fully committed to preserving national life. Think Finland, for example. We can do this, if we actually want to.

So, the Chinese ships have taught us a geography lesson. We’re a small population living on a big, long thin archipelago in the middle of a deep, cold ocean. Out nearest neighbour (other than New Caledonia) is still a long way away even as the missile flies. We’re not yet on our own, but geography means the isolation we once thought kept us safe might one day just leave us stranded. Gulp.

Ian Fletcher is a former head of New Zealand’s security agency, the GCSB, chief executive of the UK Patents Office, free trade negotiator with the European Commission and biosecurity expert for the Queensland government. These days he is a commercial flower grower in the Wairarapa and consultant to the apiculture industry with NZ Beekeeping Inc.